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Abstract—Incentive mechanism design has aroused extensive
attention for crowdsourcing applications in recent years. Most
research assumes that participants are already in the system and
aware of the existence of crowdsourcing tasks. Whereas in real
life scenarios without this assumption, it is a more effective way to
leverage incentive tree mechanisms that incentivize both users’
direct contributions and solicitations to other users. Although
some such mechanisms have been investigated, we are the
first to propose budget-consistent incentive tree mechanisms,
called generalized lottrees, which require the total payout to
all participants to be consistent with the announced budget,
while guaranteeing several other desirable properties including
continuing contribution incentive, continuing solicitation incentive,
value proportional to contribution, unprofitable solicitor bypassing,
and unprofitable sybil attack. Moreover, we present three types
of generalized lottree mechanisms, 1-Pachira, K-Pachira, and
Sharing-Pachira, which support more diversified requirements. A
solid theoretical guidance to the mechanism selection is provided
as well based on the Cumulative Prospect Theory. Both extensive
simulations and realistic experiments with 82 users have been
conducted to confirm our theoretical analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, crowdsourcing has become one of the most
popular distributed problem-solving model in which a crowd
of undefined size is engaged to solve a complex problem
through an open call [1], enabling numerous applications such
as reviewing and voting items at Amazon [2] and Yelp [3],
sharing knowledge at Yahoo! Answers [4] and Zhihu [5],
creating maps at OpenStreetMap [6], and labeling images with
the ESP game [7]. The prevalence of these crowdsourcing
applications should give the credit to various intrinsic incen-
tives such as social, service, entertainment and ethical. On
the other hand, monetary (extrinsic) incentives are leveraged
by general crowdsourcing platforms like Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) [8] and Taskcn [9] to recruit online workers
for accomplishing various tasks such as data annotation, text
translation, and identifying objects in a photo or video.
The proliferation of mobile sensing devices (e.g., smart-
phones, wearable devices, in-vehicle sensing devices) offers
a new sensing paradigm as an important branch of “crowd-
sourcing”, which extends Web-based crowdsourcing to a larger
mobile crowd, allowing to perform sensing tasks pervasively at
larger scale and easier than traditional static sensor networks.
This paradigm is often called as “mobile crowd sensing” (a.k.a.
“participatory sensing”, “opportunistic sensing” with similar
concepts), which has been adopted for various applications
such as Sensorly [10], NoiseTube [11], Common Sense [12] for
building large-scale urban sensing (network coverage, noise,
and air quality) maps, Nericell [13], VTrack [14] for traffic
sensing, and FindingNemo [15] for finding a lost child. Several
general mobile crowdsourcing platforms such as Gigwalk [16],
Jana [17] and Weichaishi [18] have recruited millions of users
to participate in various mobile tasks such as conducting con-
sumer research, launching product promotions, and creating
consumer loyalty campaigns. It is always indispensable to
provide proper incentives for compensating user’s participating
costs, including users’ time, various non-negligible resources
(e.g., computation, storage, and battery energy) and potential
treats of leaking location privacy.
Extensive research has been conducted to design incentive
mechanisms for crowdsourcing [19]–[27]. Most of existing
mechanisms assume that participants are already in the system
and aware of the existence of crowdsourcing tasks. However,
they neglect two key facts: first, participants do not exist in
the system from the beginning; second, even if there are many
registered users in a crowdsourcing platform such as MTurk
and Gigwalk, most of these potential participants are hard to
timely know the existence of tasks, as many users tend to
prohibit automatic task push, or turn a blind eye to tasks for
saving precious time, or the platform cannot push tasks to users
in right locations if users prohibit reporting their real-time GPS
coordinates. On the other hand, it is a reasonable assumption
that a small number of users are the first to participate in the
task. For example, a user may be browsing task lists actively
and decide to participate in. For another, a user may just report
his location so that the platform pushes the task to him timely.
Thus, a more sensible and effective method is to leverage
the “word-of-mouth” effect, namely to encourage these early
participants to refer other users from their social networks such
as Facebook [28], Twitter [29] and WeChat [30], or from their
neighboring community by opportunistic networking [31].
Incentive tree (a.k.a. referral tree, multi-level marketing,
affiliate marketing, and direct marketing) mechanisms provide
an effective way to address the aforementioned requirements.
An incentive tree is a tree-structured incentive mechanism in
which i) each user is rewarded for direct contributions, and in
addition, ii) a user who has already participated in can make
referrals, and solicit new users to also participate in and make
contributions. The mechanism incentivizes solicitations by
making a solicitor’s reward depend on the contributions (and
also on their further solicitations in a recursive manner) from
such solicitees [32]. One infamous incentive tree mechanism
is the Pyramid Scheme [33], which offers promising rewards
for solicitation although being illegal in many countries.
Another well-known application example is the DARPA Red
Balloon Challenge, in which an MIT team won the challenge
by using a simple incentive tree mechanism [34]. However,
this mechanism has a serious drawback – not robust against
sybil attacks. At present, many incentive tree mechanisms
have been designed against sybil attacks [32], [35]–[40], but
most of them lack a budget constraint so that participants
have “unbounded reward opportunity” (a property defined in
[32], [35]). In fact, the crowdsourcer (i.e., crowdsourcing task
organizer) often has a certain budget constraint in realistic
scenarios, which also represents the mainstream incentive type
in existing crowdsourcing platforms.
In this paper, we aim to design a class of budget-consistent
incentive tree mechanisms satisfying six desirable properties:
budget consistency (BC), continuing contribution incentive
(CCI), continuing solicitation incentive (CSI), value propor-
tional to contribution (VPC), unprofitable solicitor bypassing
(USB), and unprofitable sybil attack (USA). The latter five
properties are commonly considered by the existing work [32],
[35]–[40] so that the mechanism encourages contribution, so-
licitation, and fair play. Besides, we emphasize the importance
of the property BC, which requires that the total payout to all
participants should be consistent with the budget announced
by the crowdsourcer at the time of task distribution, namely
that the total payout is just equal to the budget, rather than
less than the budget. Otherwise, if the total payout can be cut
arbitrarily, then participants will not trust the crowdsourcer,
resulting in the decline of participation enthusiasm.
To the best of our knowledge, only the work [40] designs
a class of incentive tree mechanisms with budget constraint:
lottery tree (lottree) mechanisms, which select one participant
as the unique recipient of the payout with a probability
computed by a lottery function. The Pachira lottree is pro-
posed to satisfy CCI, CSI, VPC, USB and USA. However,
it violates BC. Moreover, it allows only one winner (for the
sake of distinction, we call it 1-Pachira lottree in the rest of
the paper), which is not always effective for all scenarios.
In fact, it is non-trivial to adjust the 1-Pachira lottree for
satisfying BC while not violating other properties, or extend it
to generalized mechanisms with multiple winners, as we will
elaborate later. By contrast, we propose an effective strategy
to rescale the 1-Pachira lottree, and prove it satisfies all the
six desirable properties. Furthermore, we design generalized
Pachira lottree mechanisms, including K-Pachira lottree that
allows multiple winners, and Sharing-Pachira lottree that
allows each participant to be a winner. In Sharing-Pachira
lottree, all participants proportionally share the budget based
on their respective winning probabilities.
Now another key and interesting question is: which mecha-
nism is best among the 1-Pachira, K-Pachira and Sharing-
Pachira lottrees? Some recent studies [41]–[46] have been
conducted to compare lottery-based (a.k.a. randomized re-
ward) and fixed payment (a.k.a. micro-payment, linear reward)
mechanisms by real-world experiments. However, they lack
a general and solid theoretical basis to account for their
experimental results, and thus fail to provide a more persuasive
guidance to the mechanism selection for different scenarios.
Moreover, none of them considers incentive tree mechanisms.
By contrast, we leverage the Cumulative Prospect Theory
(CPT) [47] to compare different generalized lottree mecha-
nisms by numerical analysis. This provides us an interesting
and important theoretical guidance to the mechanism selection
for satisfying various application requirements: If a crowd-
sourcer has a large budget constraint, or it only requires a
small number of participants, then the Sharing-Pachira lottree
mechanism should be recommended, otherwise the 1-Pachira
lottree mechanism should be recommended.
Finally, in order to verify our theoretical analysis, we first
build a social network based simulator and implement the
three generalized lottree mechanisms. Extensive simulations
are conducted to confirm our theoretical analysis. Second,
we investigate a typical application case: looking for lost
objects, and design an interesting experimental mobile game,
Treasure Hunt, to conduct extensive performance evaluations.
82 users register in our APP in 11 days, based on which 12
tasks are designed with different budget constraints and limits
on the number of participants. Experimental results are also
consistent with our theoretical analysis.
The main contributions of this paper are listed as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investi-
gate budget-consistent incentive tree mechanisms, while
guaranteeing several desirable properties, CCI, CSI, VPC,
USB and USA (Section II-B∼C and III-A).
• We design generalized lottree mechanisms in support of
multiple winners, and provide theoretical guidance to the
mechanism selection for satisfying different requirements
by leveraging the CPT (Section III-B∼E).
• We evaluate various mechanisms by both extensive sim-
ulations and realistic experiments to confirm our theo-
retical analysis, and present a typical application case
(Section IV∼V).
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first present the crowdsourcing model,
the formal definition of a generalized lottree, and the desirable
properties. We next provide some preliminaries, including the
1-Pachira lottree and the CPT.
A. Crowdsourcing Model
Suppose that there is a crowdsourcer who requires to recruit
N users to participate in a crowdsourcing campaign with a
budget constraint B. The crowdsourcer may have a specific
limit on the numberN , especially when it only requires a small
number of participants. For instance, the participatory sens-
ing data collection applications [41], GarbageWatch, What’s
Bloomin, and AssetLog, only require a few motivated users to
document various resource use issues at a university by taking
geo-tagged photos of various resources, like outdoor waste
bins, water usage of plants, bicycle racks, recycle bins, and
charge stations. Certainly, many crowdsourcing applications
expect as many participants as possible, so that they often
have no explicit limit on the number N . For instance, a large
number of participants are required to build a large-scale urban
sensing maps [10]–[12] or find a lost child quickly [15]. In
fact, both the number of required participants and the budget
constraint have nonnegligible impacts on the effectiveness of
different incentive mechanisms, as we will elaborate later.
On the other hand, users can participate in a crowdsourcing
campaign and contribute to it (e.g., solving tasks, uploading
sensing data, finding balloons or a lost child). Both the homo-
geneous and heterogeneous user models are considered [26],
where the former is a special case of the latter. The former can
account for atom tasks where each user can complete only a
single task and thus make the same contribution. For instance,
Gigwalk [16] recruits users who are in a shopping mall for
conducting consumer research, where each user can complete
only one questionnaire. The latter can account for divisible
tasks or crowdsourcing campaigns that users could contin-
uously participate in, where different users may complete
different numbers of tasks or participate in a campaign for dif-
ferent durations, resulting different contributions. For instance,
Microsoft has recruited users to add panoramic images to its
Bing Map results through Gigwalk [16], where different users
are willing to take different amounts of photos. For another, in
FindingNemo [15] different users may spend different amounts
of time on looking for a lost child. Generally, the contribution
of a user u is denoted by C(u), C(u) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, users can also solicit new users. Such solic-
itations induce a tree T . Each user is represented as a tree
node u, and there is a directed edge (u, v) between two users
u and v if v has participated in the campaign in response to
a solicitation by u. In other words, if u participates in the
campaign via a solicitation by u, it becomes a child-node of
v in T . The crowdsourcer is the root node r. The users who
have participated in the campaign directly in response to the
solicitation from the crowdsourcer are the child-nodes of r. Tu
denotes the subtree of T rooted at node u. E(T ) denotes the
set of directed edges in T . T is a weighted tree in which the
weight of node u is its contribution to the campaign, C(u).
Since the crowdsourcer has no direct contribution, we have
C(r) = 0. The total contribution of all nodes in T is denoted
by C(T ) =
∑
u∈T C(u).
B. Generalized Lottree
A generalized∗ lottree is an incentive tree mechanism that
leverages lotteries to probabilistically select one or multiple
participants as the winner(s), and pay out a reward to each
winner. One key component of a generalized lottree is a lottery
function L(u) (0 ≤ L(u) ≤ 1) that determines the lottery
value (i.e., winning probability) of each node u ∈ T , and
satisfies
∑
u∈T L(u) = 1. The lottery value of a node should
depend on both the tree structure and nodes’ contributions,
so that both contributions and solicitations from participants
are encouraged. Another key component is a reward function
R(u) that determines the reward of each node u ∈ T , and
satisfies
∑
u∈T R(u) ≤ B. The reward of a node depends
on the crowdsourcer’s reward strategy, namely how many
winners are allowed among |T | − 1 participants. Specifically,
three reward strategies are considered: 1-lottree with only one
winner, K-lottree with K(1 < K < |T | − 1) winners, and
Sharing-lottree that allows each participant to be a winner.
C. Desirable Properties
While the main objective of a generalized lottree mech-
anism is to incentivize both contributions and solicitations
under a certain budget constraint, it should also guarantee the
fairness and be robust against various strategic behaviors by
participants. In the following, we define the set of desirable
properties that a generalized lottree should ideally satisfy.
Budget Consistency (BC): A generalized lottree satisfies
BC if the total reward to all nodes in the tree T except the root
node r is consistent with the budget, i.e.,
∑
u∈T\{r}R(u) =
B. This property has a stricter constraint than the so-called
Zero Value to Root (ZVR) property defined in [40]. ZVR only
requires that the reward to the root node of the tree is zero:
R(r) = 0, but allowing that the total payout is less than the
budget. We argue that it is not sufficient, as it will lead to an
uncommitted crowdsourcer and result in the decline of users’
participation enthusiasm.
Continuing Contribution Incentive (CCI): A generalized
lottree satisfies CCI if it provides nodes with increasing ex-
pected reward in response to increased contribution. Formally,
given a tree T , if a node u ∈ T increases its contribution,
C′(u) > C(u), and all other nodes v ∈ T \ {u} maintain the
same contribution, C′(v) = C(v), then the expected reward
of u increases: E[R′(u)] > E[R(u)].
Continuing Solicitation Incentive (CSI): A generalized
lottree satisfies CSI if each node always has an incentive to
solicit new nodes. We follow the notion of “weak solicitation
incentive (WSI)” defined in [40]. Formally, if the subtree of
a node u ∈ T includes some node p: p ∈ Tu, but does not
include some other node q: q ∈ T \ Tu, and there is a new
node n: C(n) > 0, which in case 1 joins the tree as a child of
p, and in case 2 joins the tree as a child of q, then the reward
of u in case 1, denoted by R′(u), is greater in expectation
than that in case 2, denoted by R′′(u): E[R′(u)] > E[R′′(u)].
Value Proportional to Contribution (VPC): This property
demands that the mechanism should maintain a notion of
fairness among nodes, as intuitively participants expect that
their rewards are proportional to their contributions. We say
that a generalized lottree satisfies ϕ-VPC for some ϕ > 0,
if it ensures that the expected reward of each node u is at
least ϕ times the relative contribution made by that node:
E[R(u)] ≥ ϕC(u)/C(T ).
Unprofitable Solicitor Bypassing (USB): A generalized
lottree satisfies USB if a new node can never gain expected
∗The original definition of “lottree” allows multiple winners, but in fact
such generalized cases are not considered throughout the paper [40]. Thus, the
word “generalized” is purposely used here to emphasize that the mechanism
allows one or multiple winners.
reward by joining the tree as a child of some node other than
its solicitor. Violation of this property can result in undesirable
consequences: participants will lose interest in soliciting new
nodes, as new nodes tend to join the tree not as children of
the nodes that solicited them. Formally, if nodes u and v are
in the tree: {u, v} ⊂ T , and there is a new node n: C(n) > 0,
which in case 1 joins the tree as a child of u, and in case 2
joins the tree as a child of v, then the reward of n in case 1,
denoted by R′(n), is not smaller in expectation than that in
case 2, denoted by R′′(n): E[R′(n)] ≥ E[R′′(n)], which, by
symmetry, implies E[R′(n)] = E[R′′(n)].
Unprofitable Sybil Attack (USA): This property demands
that no participant can gain lottery value by pretending to
have multiple identities to join the tree as a set of Sybil nodes
instead of joining singly. Formally, the Sybil attack is defined
as follows: Given any node u ∈ T whose parent is p and who
has d ≥ 0 children v1, v2, . . . , vd, u launches the Sybil attack
by splitting itself into multiple replicas (i.e., Sybil nodes),
denoted by u1, u2, . . . , us (s > 1),
∑s
i=1 C(ui) = C(u); each
Sybil node ui can only be a child of p, or a child of one
of the other Sybil nodes; each node vj is a child of one
Sybil node. The total expected reward for u from this Sybil
attack is
∑s
i=1 E[R(ui)]. We say that a generalized lottree
satisfies USA if for any node u ∈ T , it cannot gain expected
reward by any Sybil attack without making extra contributions:
E[R(u)] ≥
∑s
i=1 E[R(ui)].
D. 1-Pachira Lottree
The 1-Pachira lottree has been proven to satisfy CCI, CSI,
VPC, USB and USA [40]. In principle, the 1-Pachira lottree
can be defined using any function pi that satisfies the following
properties:
(i) pi(0) = 0, pi(1) = 1;
(ii) ∀c ∈ [0, 1]: dpi(c)dc ≥ β (minimum slope of β);
(iii) ∀c ∈ [0, 1]: d
2pi(c)
dc2 > 0 (strictly convex).
In this paper, we follow a particularly convenient and
intuitive function with the above properties:
pi(c) = βc+ (1− β)c1+δ, (1)
where β and δ are two input parameters that tradeoff solici-
tation incentive against fairness. Then for each node u ∈ T ,
a weight is computed as the function pi applied to its pro-
portional contribution: W (u) = pi(C(u)/C(T )). Besides, the
weight of a subtree Tu is defined as
W (Tu) = pi
(
C(Tu)
C(T )
)
. (2)
Specially, for any leaf node u, it holds thatW (u) = W (Tu) =
pi(C(u)/C(T )). Finally, the 1-Pachira lottree determines the
lottery value of each node u ∈ T as the weight of the subtree
rotted at u minus the weights of all u’s child subtrees:
L(u) =W (Tu)−
∑
(u,v)∈E(T )
W (Tv). (3)
Only one node obtains all the reward with probability L(u).
E. Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT)
An effective lottree mechanism should consider how people
perceive the payout for different reward strategies based on
the cognitive psychology of lottery gambling [48]. For this
purpose, the Prospect Theory, a generally accepted economic
model proposed by Kahneman and Tversky [49], can ade-
quately describe how individuals evaluate losses and gains in
lotteries instead of the expected utility theory. Furthermore,
the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) extends it to uncertain
as well to risky prospects with any number of outcomes,
which also confirms a distinctive fourfold pattern of risk
attitudes: risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses of
high probability; risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for
losses of low probability [47]. Note that only the gain case
is considered for lottrees. Specifically, for a single outcome
of the gain x ≥ 0 with a probability p, the value function
and weighting function are respectively defined based on a
nonlinear transformation as follows:
ν(x) = xα, (4)
ω+(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ
. (5)
The cumulative prospect value (CPV) is then computed as
individuals’ perceived gain:
CPV (x, p) = ν(x)ω+(p). (6)
Furthermore, if there are a series of possible outcomes with
gain-probability pairs (xi, pi), 1 ≤ i ≤ m, then the cumulative
decision weight is defined by:
τ+i = ω
+(pi + · · ·+ pm)− ω
+(pi+1 + · · ·+ pm), 1 ≤ i < m,
(7)
τ+m = ω
+(pm). (8)
The CPV is then computed as:
CPV ((xi, pi), 1 ≤ i ≤ m) =
m∑
i=1
τ+i ν(xi). (9)
III. GENERALIZED PACHIRA LOTTREE
In this section, we first present how to rescale the 1-Pachira
lottree for guaranteeing all the desirable properties. Note that,
since each node’s reward depends only on its own lottery
value for the 1-Pachira lottree, it is only required to consider
the lottery value for analyzing various properties. We then
extend it to K-Pachira lottree and Sharing-Pachira lottree,
respectively. Finally, we analyze how to select mechanisms
based on the CPT, and give an important theoretical guideline.
A. Rescaling 1-Pachira Lottree
The 1-Pachira lottree does not satisfy ZVR, because the
root node can obtain the reward with probability L(r) > 0.
It also violates BC, as ZVR is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for BC. It is a straightforward strategy to rescale
the lottree for satisfying ZVR by distributing the root’s lottery
value to the other nodes. Interestingly, however, it is non-trivial
for a rescaling strategy to ensure the desirable properties,
especially for BC, USB and USA. For instance, a rescaling
strategy is proposed by [40] to distribute the root’s lottery
value among the other nodes in proportion to their lottery
values (Fig. 1(b)), but it violates USB. Although another
rescaling strategy is further used to satisfy USB, it still violates
BC. Intuitively, a crowdsourcer may tend to use the other
two rescaling strategies: one is to distribute the root’s lottery
value to nodes who are at a lower level of the tree, e.g., the
second-level nodes who join the tree directly in response to
the solicitation from the crowdsourcer (Fig. 1(c)); the other is
to distribute the root’s lottery value to nodes who join the tree
earlier, e.g., the first two nodes who join the tree regardless of
the tree structure (Fig. 1(d)). Both the two strategies encourage
users to participate in the campaign as soon as possible, which
is also a good property for an incentive mechanism. In the
following, we define two more general rescaling strategies.
Structure-dependent Rescaling: Given a lottree with lot-
tery value L(u) for each non-root node u and L(r) for the
root node r, a rescaling strategy is structure-dependent if it
distributes r’s lottery value to part of nodes {vi} who are at
the specified levels or locations based on the tree structure
with proportion wi > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, so that vi’s lottery value is
rescaled as L′(vi) = L(vi)+wiL(r),
∑l
i=1 wi = 1, r’s lottery
value is rescaled as L′(r) = 0, and other nodes’ lottery values
remain the same.
Time-dependent Rescaling: Given a lottree with lottery
value L(u) for each non-root node u and L(r) for the root
node r, a rescaling strategy is time-dependent if it distributes
r’s lottery value to part of nodes {vi} who are in the specified
time orders joining the tree with proportion wi > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ l,
so that vi’s lottery value is rescaled as L
′(vi) = L(vi) +
wiL(r),
∑l
i=1 wi = 1, r’s lottery value is rescaled as L
′(r) =
0, and other nodes’ lottery values remain the same.
Besides, we define the first-is-root rescaling strategy as the
special case of both structure-dependent and time-dependent
rescaling strategies, as illustrated in Fig. 1(e) and Fig. 1(f).
First-is-root Rescaling: Given a lottree with lottery value
L(u) for each non-root node u and L(r) for the root node r, a
first-is-root rescaling strategy rescales the lottery value of node
u1, who is the first to join the tree, as L
′(u1) = L(u1)+L(r),
r’s lottery value as L′(r) = 0, and leaves other nodes’ lottery
values unchanged.
We next analyze the above rescaling strategies one by one.
Theorem 1. Any structure-dependent rescaling strategy vio-
lates USB except the first-is-root rescaling.
Proof. Let us first consider any structure-dependent rescaling
strategy except the first-is-root rescaling, where some nodes
will tend to bypass their solicitors strategically to become the
nodes who are at the specified levels or locations for gaining
a higher lottery value. It can be proved by the following
example: For a lottree illustrated in Fig. 1(a), if user u4 with
lottery value L(u4) bypasses its solicitor u1 to become the
child of r, then its lottery value L′(u4) remains the same in
the case without structure-dependent rescaling as illustrated in
Fig. 2(a): L′(u4) = W (u4) = pi(C(u4)/C(T )) = L(u4), but
its lottery value L′′(u4) can be increased after the structure-
dependent rescaling as illustrated in Fig. 2(b): L′′(u4) =
L(u4)+w4LSB(r) > L(u4). This means that USB is violated
after a structure-dependent rescaling, as u4 can gain a higher
lottery value by bypassing its solicitor u1.
Then we consider the first-is-root rescaling strategy. In this
special case, no node can bypass its solicitor to become the
first node. It implies that no node can gain a higher lottery
value by bypassing its solicitor. Thus, the first-is-root rescaling
strategy satisfies USB.
Theorem 2. Any time-dependent rescaling strategy violates
USA except the first-is-root rescaling.
Proof. Let us first consider any time-dependent rescaling
strategy except the first-is-root rescaling, where some nodes
will tend to launch a Sybil attack by having multiple identities
in the specified time orders joining the tree for gaining a higher
lottery value. It can be proved by the following example: For
a lottree T illustrated in Fig. 1(a), if user u1 with lottery value
L(u1) splits itself into two nodes u11 and u12, which are the
first two nodes joining the tree, resulting in a new lottree T ′
illustrated in Fig. 3(a), then u1 cannot gain lottery value in
the case without time-dependent rescaling:
LSA(u11) + LSA(u12)
=W (T ′u11)− [W (u12) +W (u2) +W (u4)] +W (u12)
=W (T ′u11)− [W (u2) +W (u4)]
=pi
(
C(u11)+C(u12)+C(u2)+C(u4)
C(T )
)
−[W (u2)+W (u4)]
=pi
(
C(u1) + C(u2) + C(u4)
C(T )
)
− [W (u2) +W (u4)]
=W (Tu1)− [W (u2) +W (u4)]
=L(u1), (10)
which also implies that the lottery value of r, L(r), remains
the same. However, a time-dependent rescaling will result in
a new lottree T ′′ illustrated in Fig. 3(b), where u1’s lottery
value L′′(u1) will gain as follows:
L′′(u1) = LSA(u11) + w1L(r) + LSA(u12) + w2L(r)
= LSA(u11) + LSA(u12) + L(r)
= L(u1) + L(r)
> L(u1). (11)
This means that USA is violated after a time-dependent
rescaling, as u1 can gain a higher lottery value by launching
a Sybil attack.
Then we consider the first-is-root rescaling strategy. For any
node in the lottree except the first node, it is impossible to gain
a higher lottery value by launching a Sybil attack, as none
of its sybil nodes may become the first node to occupy the
original lottery value of the root node. Now we consider the
first node u1. According to the definition of the first-is-root
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(c) After structure-dependent
rescaling (w1 + w3 = 1)
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(d) After time-dependent
rescaling (w1 + w2 = 1)
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(e) After first-is-root
rescaling
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(f) Equivalent of
the lottree in (e)
Fig. 1. Illustration of different rescaling strategies for a 1-Pachira lottree with a crowdsourcer r and four participants u1 ∽ u4, where ui denotes the i-th
user based on the time of joining the tree, L(ui) and L(r) denote the original lottery values according to the original tree structure and lottery function Eq.
(3), and the value beside each node denotes the respective lottery value before or after rescaling.
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(b) After structure-dependent rescal-
ing (w1 +w3 + w4 = 1)
Fig. 2. Illustration of the impact from the structure-dependent rescaling
strategy on USB when u4 bypasses its solicitor in Fig. 1(a), where LSB(∗)
denotes a new lottery value caused by the solicitor bypassing behavior.
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(b) After time-dependent
rescaling (w1 + w2 = 1)
Fig. 3. Illustration of the impact from the time-dependent rescaling strategy
on USA when u1 launches a Sybil attack by splitting itself into two nodes
u11 and u12 in Fig. 1(a), where LSA(∗) denotes a new lottery value caused
by the Sybil attack.
rescaling, if u1 does not launch any Sybil attack, its lottery
value will be:
L′(u1) = L(u1) + L(r) = 1−
∑
ui∈T\{r,u1}
L(ui). (12)
If u1 launches a Sybil attack by splitting itself into s replicas
u11, u12, . . . , u1s (s > 1),
∑s
i=1 C(u1i) = C(u1), then the
original lottery value of the root node is only distributed to
the first Sybil node u11 regardless of how u1 organize the
structure of Sybil nodes, and its lottery value will be:
s∑
i=1
L′′(u1i) = LSA(u11) + L(r) +
s∑
i=2
LSA(u1i)
= 1−
∑
ui∈T\{r,u1}
L(ui). (13)
This implies that the first node is also impossible to gain a
higher lottery value by launching a Sybil attack. Thus, the
first-is-root rescaling strategy satisfies USA.
According to the definition of the first-is-root rescaling
strategy, it is straightforward to satisfy BC. It is also easy
to infer that the first-is-root rescaling strategy satisfies CCI
and VPC, as the lottery value gets higher for the first node u1
and remains unchanged for any other node v ∈ T \ {r, u1}.
One may think that in the first-is-root rescaling strategy the
first node will have no incentive to solicit new nodes as it will
become the root node and all other nodes are its descendants
regardless of whether it makes referrals. Considering this, one
may think the first-is-root rescaling strategy violates CSI. In
fact, however, it can be proved that the first node still has an
incentive to solicit new nodes due to the competitive effect.
Lemma 1. The first-is-root rescaling strategy satisfies CSI.
Proof. Since the first-is-root rescaling strategy does not
change the lottery value of any node except the root node
and the first node, it is only required to prove that the first
node has an incentive to solicit new nodes. Let us consider an
example illustrated in Fig. 4: u1 and u2 are the first two nodes.
According to the first-is-root rescaling strategy, u1 is rescaled
as the root node, and u2 is the child of u1, as illustrated in Fig.
4(a). Now assume that there is a new node u3: C(u3) > 0,
which in case 1 joins the tree in response of u1’s solicitation
(Fig. 4(b)), and in case 2 joins the tree in response of u2’s
solicitation (Fig. 4(c)). The lottery values of u1 in the two
cases are respectively as follows:
L′(u1) = 1−
[
pi
(
C(u2)
C(T )
)
+ pi
(
C(u3)
C(T )
)]
. (14)
L′′(u1) = 1− pi
(
C(u2) + C(u3)
C(T )
)
. (15)
Due to the strict convexity of the function pi, the following
inequality holds:
pi
(
C(u2)
C(T )
)
+ pi
(
C(u3)
C(T )
)
< pi
(
C(u2) + C(u3)
C(T )
)
, (16)
which implies that L′(u1) > L
′′(u1). Thus, CSI is satisfied.
The aforementioned analysis together prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. The first-is-root rescaling strategy satisfies all
desirable properties, including BC, CCI, CSI, VPC, USB and
USA.
Besides, the first-is-root rescaling strategy has an additional
advantage: users will compete to be the first participant for
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Fig. 4. Illustration of a lottree using the first-is-root rescaling strategy. (a)
denotes the initial lottree; (b) and (c) denote two cases where new node u3
joins the tree, and the 2-tuple beside each node ui denotes the respective
contribution and lottery value: (C(ui), L(ui)).
winning the extra lottery value, which is benefit for recruiting
the first batch of users as soon as possible.
B. K-Pachira Lottree
One basic problem for extending the 1-Pachira lottree to
K-Pachira lottree is how to select K winners based on users’
lottery values. Generally, there are four potential strategies:
Strategy A: K different winners are selected in K rounds.
After each round, the selected winner is excluded from the
candidate set, and the next winner is selected from the rest of
nodes based on their respective lottery values.
Strategy B: All nodes are sorted according to their decreas-
ing lottery values, and then the top K nodes are selected as
winners.
Strategy C: K winners are selected in K rounds. In each
round, a winner is selected from all nodes based on their
respective lottery values, and it is never excluded from the
candidate set. It means a node may be selected as winners
multiple times.
Strategy D: All nodes are allocated virtual lottery tickets
proportionately based on their respective lottery values, and
then K tickets are drew randomly in one round to determine
their owners as winners.
It is interesting to see that both Strategy A and B violate
USB, while both Strategy C and D maintain all desirable
properties of the 1-Pachira lottree with first-is-root rescaling.
We first analyze Strategy A by an example illustrated in Fig.
4: Assume that both two nodes u1 and u2 in Fig. 4(a) solicit a
new node u3, and then u3 in case 1 joins the tree in response
of u1’s solicitation (Fig. 4(b)), and in case 2 joins the tree in
response of u2’s solicitation (Fig. 4(c)). Meanwhile, assume
that three nodes have the same contribution, 10, and the K-
Pachira lottree is adopted with K = 2. We can get different
lottery values for case 1 and 2, as illustrated in Fig. 4(b) and
4(c). Furthermore, we can compute the probability that u3
becomes one of the two winners:
P (u3) = L(u3) +
L(u1)L(u3)
L(u1) + L(u3)
+
L(u2)L(u3)
L(u2) + L(u3)
, (17)
which equals to 0.649 and 0.648 for case 1 and case 2,
respectively. Obviously, this violates USB. Specifically, a new
node tends to become the child of a solicitor with higher
lottery value, so that it has a better chance to win in the next
round after the node with higher lottery value is selected and
excluded from the candidate set.
Strategy B is a competitive strategy in essence. It is not
difficult to infer that a new node tends to become the child of
a solicitor with lottery value higher than itself so as to maintain
its competitive advantage over other nodes with lower lottery
values. Thus, Strategy B also violates USB.
More generally, in order to satisfy USB, each node’s final
winning probability should be independent of other nodes’
lottery values. Both strategies C and D follow this principle,
and thus satisfy USB. In essence, Strategy C and D are
equivalent to the sampling with replacement and the sampling
without replacement in the probability theory, respectively.
Specifically, each node u has the same winning probability
L(u) in each round for Strategy C, and the same node has a
slightly higher probability of winning at least once for Strategy
D. It is also not difficult to see that both Strategy C and D
maintain other desirable properties.
After determining K winners, another basic problem for
extending the 1-Pachira lottree to K-Pachira lottree is how to
allocate rewards to these winners. It should follow a similar
principle, namely that each node’s final reward should be
independent of other nodes’ lottery values. It is a good choice
to allocate the total reward B equally to K winners, where
each node has the same expected reward as that by using the 1-
Pachira lottree mechanism. In the rest of paper, when referring
to the K-Pachira lottree, we use Strategy C together with the
reward equipartition strategy for convenience.
C. Sharing-Pachira Lottree
In essence, the Sharing-Pachira lottree is equivalent to one
extreme case of the K-Pachira lottree with infinite lottery
drawings. Under this case, all nodes will proportionally share
the budget based on their respective lottery values. In other
words, each node u will share a reward:
R(u) = B ∗ L(u). (18)
It is easy to know that the Sharing-Pachira lottree maintains
all desirable properties as each node’s reward is independent
of other nodes’ lottery values.
D. CPT-based Mechanism Selection
Since each user has an uncertain reward before the end of
a crowdsourcing campaign for both 1-Pachira and K-Pachira
lottrees, it is important how a user perceives the payout, which
decides whether the user is willing to make contributions and
solicitations. As introduced in Sec. II-E, we can leverage CPT
to analyze how users perceive the payout for different reward
mechanisms. For the 1-Pachira lottree, the perceived reward
for each user u can be computed according to Eqs. (4)-(6) by
using the total reward B as the gain x and the lottery value
L(u) as the probability p. For the K-Pachira lottree, each user
u has K possible outcomes with gain-probability pairs:(
B · i
K
,CiK(L(u))
i(1− L(u))K−i
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ K, (19)
and then the perceived reward for user u can be computed
according to Eqs. (7)-(9). For the Sharing-Pachira lottree,
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Fig. 5. A user’s perceived reward with various lottery values.
each user u has a certain reward as shown in Eq. (18).
We compare a user’s perceived reward with various lottery
values and two different budgets (B = 100, 1000) for 4
mechanisms (1-Pachira, 5-Pachira, 10-Pachira, and Sharing-
Pachira), as shown in Fig. 5. Three interesting phenomenons
can be observed:
i) When the budget stays the same, a user with a lower
lottery value perceives the largest payout by the 1-Pachira
lottree among all mechanisms, and a user with a higher lottery
value perceives the largest payout by the Sharing-Pachira
lottree, whereas the K-Pachira lottree always stays the middle
level regardless of the lottery value.
ii) When the budget stays the same, a distinct critical lottery
value exists, below which one may prefer the 1-Pachira lottree
to the Sharing-Pachira lottree, and above which one may
prefer the Sharing-Pachira lottree to the 1-Pachira lottree.
iii) As the budget increases, the critical lottery value will
become larger.
In essence, the above observations are consistent with the
CPT that one tends to risk seeking for higher gains of low
probability, and risk aversion for lower gains of high probabil-
ity. This provides us an interesting and important theoretical
guidance to the mechanism selection for satisfying different
application requirements as follows.
Guidance to Mechanism Selection: If a crowdsourcer has
a large budget constraint, or it only requires a small number
of participants, then the Sharing-Pachira lottree mechanism
should be recommended, otherwise the 1-Pachira mechanism
should be recommended.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BY SIMULATIONS
To evaluate the performance of different lottree mechanisms
under various scenarios, we build a simulator and conduct
extensive simulations. Moreover, the impacts of the budget
constraint and the number of required participants are inves-
tigated. In this section, we present the simulation framework,
parameter settings, and simulation results.
A. Simulation Framework and Parameter Settings
We build a simulator based on the following four steps:
Step 1): The crowdsourcer pushes the crowdsourcing cam-
paign information (i.e., send solicitations) to an initial set of
users.
Step 2): Each solicited user decides whether to participate in
the campaign: He first decides whether to consider a possible
participation according to a participating interest factor. If he
does consider it and supposes to make a specific contribution
following a contribution model, he then evaluates the perceived
reward according to a payout valuation model. Finally, he
decides to participate if his perceived reward outweighs the
cost of participation following a cost model.
Step 3): Each participant decides whether to solicit other
users: He first predicts how many users from his acquaintances
would accept his solicitations based on a solicitation prediction
model, and then computes the perceived gain from soliciting
according to a payout valuation model. Finally, he decides
to send solicitations if his perceived gain outweighs the cost
of sending solicitations following a cost model. Each user’s
acquaintances are determined based on a social network model.
Step 4): Repeat Steps 2) and 3) until the number of
participants reaches the crowdsourcer’s requirement or the
campaign deadline arrives.
The aforementioned simulation framework is similar to [40],
which involves in a set of theories and models that have been
widely accepted in literature. We briefly describe these models
and some parameter settings as follows.
Social Network Model: An evolving network model [50]
is used to model the acquaintanceship of users, which exhibits
several recognized properties of a social network, such as
short average path length, broad degree distribution, high
clustering, and community structure. Three basic parameters
for the model, N0, mr, and ms, are set the same as specified
by Toivonen et al. [50].
Participating Interest Factor: Each solicited user has two
behavioral intentions: showing absolutely no interest or having
an interest to consider whether to participate in. We assume
each user has a participating interest factor, PIF , to express
his likelihood of two behavioral intentions.
Contribution Model: As described in Section I, a more
general model, heterogeneous user model, is considered.
Specifically, each user u’s contribution, C(u), is assumed to
follow a random uniform distribution.
Payout Valuation Model: As described before, we leverage
CPT to compute the perceived reward for different mecha-
nisms. For Step 2), we first compute the lottery value based on
the current tree structure, and then derive the perceived reward
as described in Section III-D. For Step 3), we compute the
perceived reward from soliciting new participants, and derive
the difference between it and the original reward without
sending solicitations as the perceived gain. The key parameters
β and δ are set the same as [40] for computing lottery values,
and α and γ are set the same as [47] for leveraging CPT.
Solicitation Prediction Model: Each user u assumes that
all his ζu neighbors have not joined in the campaign, and each
of his neighbors will join in the campaign with the probability
PIF if he sending solicitations. Thus, user u will predict the
number of users who accept his solicitations as ζu ∗ PIF .
Cost Model: Each user u has a cost of participation,
CP (u), and another cost of sending solicitations, CS(u), to
represent his expected rewards, which are assumed to follow
two different random uniform distributions.
The above models involve in many parameters as listed in
Table I. Moreover, in order to evaluate the impacts of the
budget constraint (B) and the number of required participants
(N ), we vary the values of N from 5 to 50 with the increment
of 1, and set two different values of B as 1000 and 5000.
For each setting, simulations are repeated 100 times and
the respective average results are obtained, so as to reduce
variance.
TABLE I
PARAMETER SETTINGS
Model Parameter and Value
N0 = 30,
Social Network Model Pr(mr=1)=0.95, Pr(mr=0)=0.05,
ms ∼ U [1, 3]
Participating Interest Factor PIF = 0.5
Contribution Model C(u) ∼ U [1, 500]
β = 0.5, δ = 0.08,
Payout Valuation Model α = 0.88, γ = 0.61
CP (u) ∼ U [1, 30]
Cost Model CS(u) ∼ U [1, 15]
B. Simulation Results
Fig. 6 shows the relationship between the number of re-
quired solicitations and the number of required participants for
three lottree mechanisms, 1-Pachira, 10-Pachira, and Sharing-
Pachira, under different budget constraints. If we set the same
budget constraint and the same number of required number of
participants, then the less solicitations a mechanism requires,
the easier it is to achieve the requirement of the crowdsourcing
campaign. In other words, we use the number of required
solicitations as a key metric for mechanism selection. First,
when the budget stays the same, we can observe two common
and interesting phenomenons independently from Fig. 6(a) and
Fig. 6(b):
i) The number of required solicitations increase with the
number of required participants. Meanwhile, there is a larger
and larger increasing rate of the number of required solicita-
tions for Sharing-Pachira, whereas 1-Pachira and 10-Pachira
have a relatively lower increasing rate. It means that: as the
number of required participants increases, Sharing-Pachira
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Fig. 6. Relationship between the number of required solicitations and the
number of required participants.
will be harder and harder to achieve the requirement of the
crowdsourcing campaign, whereas at this time, 1-Pachira and
10-Pachira could be the better choice.
ii) When a small number of participants is required, the
number of required solicitations for the three lottree mecha-
nisms presents the following relationships: Sharing-Pachira <
10-Pachira < 1-Pachira, meaning that Sharing-Pachira is the
beast choice; when a large number of participants is required,
it presents an opposite relationships: 1-Pachira < 10-Pachira
< Sharing-Pachira, meaning that 1-Pachira is the best choice;
whereas 10-Pachira is almost always not the best choice.
Generally, there is a distinct critical value of the required
number of participants, below which one may prefer 1-Pachira
to Sharing-Pachira, and above which one may prefer Sharing-
Pachira to 1-Pachira. Specifically, this critical value is 10 (16)
when B = 1000 (5000).
Second, we can observe another interesting phenomenon by
combining Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b):
iii) As the budget increases, the critical value of the required
number of participants will become larger.
Summary: In essence, the above results are consistent with
the CPT and the analysis in Sec. III-D, which also validate our
important theoretical guidance to the mechanism selection in
Sec. III-D.
V. LOOKING FOR LOST OBJECTS: AN APPLICATION CASE
AND ITS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first investigate an application case: look-
ing for lost objects. Then we design an experimental mobile
game, Treasure Hunt, and present a series of experiments
and several metrics for evaluating the performance of lottree
mechanisms. Finally, we provide the experimental results.
A. Looking For Lost Objects: An Application Case
As elaborated in Section I, an incentive tree mechanism
could be used in many crowdsourcing and mobile crowd
sensing applications. Next we mainly consider a very useful
application case: looking for lost objects, such as a lost child,
pet, smartphone, key, and wallet. Imagine a child attaches
a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) peripheral, e.g., Chipolo
[51], in his clothes or shoes. The low power consumption
and miniaturization of BLE peripherals make it perfect for
tracking the child continuously. If the child is lost, many
smartphone users can be recruited to cooperatively look for
him by continuous Bluetooth scanning and even locate him
[15]. There is no doubt that incentive is a key to the success
of this application.
B. Treasure Hunt: An Experimental Mobile Game
In order to evaluate the performance of lottree mechanisms,
we design an interesting experimental mobile game, Treasure
Hunt, which could be used directly for looking for lost objects
due to the same intrinsic mechanism. The game involves in
three roles:
• a crowdsourcer residing in the cloud, who is responsible
for publicizing treasure hunt tasks, monitoring users’
participation process, and allocating rewards,
• a set of users, who register in our mobile APP to play
games by using a Bluetooth-enabled smartphone, and
• a treasure, which is in fact a volunteer moving freely with
a Bluetooth-enabled smartphone.
In essence, Treasure Hunt is to find the so-called treasure
by discovering its Bluetooth when a user gets close to it. A
treasure hunt task could be characterized by the reward budget,
the number of required participants, the treasure ID (i.e., its
Bluetooth ID), the task deadline, and the incentive type. Next
we will introduce the operation procedure of the game, the
contribution function design, and the incentive mechanism
design, respectively.
Operation Procedure of Treasure Hunt: It consists of six
main points as follows.
i) The crowdsourcer publicizes a treasure hunt task, and
pushes the related information to all registered users. Note that
only a part of users who run our mobile APP in the background
and maintain a Internet connection can get the task information
timely.
ii) Each user who received the task information decides
whether to participate in. If yes, he turns on his Bluetooth,
optionally opens his GPS, and periodically reports the partici-
pation information (time duration of Bluetooth scanning, GPS
points) to the crowdsourcer.
iii) Each participating user decides whether to send solicita-
tions to other users through a social network. The solicitation
structure is recorded by the crowdsourcer.
iv) If some user discovers the treasure, then he reports the
result to the crowdsourcer.
v) When the number of participants achieves the require-
ment, then no user can participate in any longer.
vi) After the deadline arrives, the crowdsourcer builds an
incentive tree according to the participants’ contributions and
solicitation relationships, and then allocate rewards according
to the announced incentive mechanism.
Contribution Function Design of Treasure Hunt: Intu-
itively, we hope that each user u has a long time duration
for Bluetooth scanning and a long travelling distance so as to
more easily find the treasure. Thus, we design a contribution
function, C(u), by comprehensively considering three factors:
time duration for Bluetooth scanning, Dur(u), traveling dis-
tance,Dis(u), and whether the user find the treasure, Find(u)
(a boolean function), namely that,
C(u) = 0.5∗Dur(u)+0.5∗0.1∗Dis(u)+120∗Find(u). (20)
Here, Dur(u) is measured in minutes, Dis(u) is measured in
meters, the number 0.5 is a weight factor, 0.1 is set because of
that a traveling distance of 1 m takes about 0.1 min on average
in our experiments, and 120 means that an extra contribution
during 120 mins (the duration of a task) will be given to the
user who finds the treasure.
Incentive Mechanism Design of Treasure Hunt: One of
the most important objectives of Treasure Hunt is to com-
pare the three lottree mechanisms: 1-Pachira, K-Pachira, and
Sharing-Pachira, by realistic experiments. However, it seems
hard for users to understand the details of these mechanisms
if we describe them straightforwardly. In fact, it is completely
unnecessary for users to know about such complicated design.
Instead, we only need to tell users a simple rule:
“Each user will earn a value, and will be rewarded based
his value.”
To make it more intuitionistic for users to understand how
to evaluate their values, we present the following descriptions
to them:
“How to get a higher value: the longer duration you turn
on your Bluetooth, the longer distance you travel (based on
your GPS trajectory), the more friends you recommend to, then
the higher value you get. Besides, the first participant and the
participant who find the treasure will be given an extra value.”
Moreover, we show users intuitionistic descriptions on 1-
Pachira, K-Pachira, and Sharing-Pachira lottree mechanisms,
respectively:
“Mechanism A: Only one participant can get all the reward
(B). Of course, the higher value, the more likely you win.”
“Mechanism B: We will have lottery drawings K times,
and each winner will get one K-th of the total reward (B).
The higher value, the more likely you win.”
“Mechanism C: Every participant can get a reward. The
higher value, the higher reward. But the total budget is B.”
C. Experimental Settings and Evaluation Metrics
We conduct Treasure Hunt experiments in a university
campus. For the convenience of comparing the three kinds
of incentive mechanisms, we need to have a set of registered
users as a basis. Thus, we first post an advertisement on our
university BBS and some social groups in social networks
(QQ and WeChat) seeking people to register in our mobile
APP two days before the experiments officially start. In our
advertisement, we tell users the game rules, and announce a
budget of 500 RMB to recruit users, who will share the reward
equally without limitation on the number of participants.
Finally, 62 users registered in our APP before the experiments
officially start. After that, we publicize 12 Treasure Hunt tasks
in 9 days. Each task begins at a random time and lasts for
2 hours. In order to investigate the impact of the number of
required participants (N ), we set two values of N as 10 (tasks
1-3) and 50 (tasks 4, 6, 8) while fixing the budget constraint as
B = 100 RMB. Meanwhile, in order to investigate the impact
of the budget constraint (B), we set three values of B as 50
RMB (tasks 5, 7, 9), 100 RMB (tasks 4, 6, 8), and 500 RMB
(tasks 10-12) while fixing the value of N as N = 50. The
detailed settings are shown in Table II.
TABLE II
EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
Task Release Budget Limit on # of Incentive
No. Date (B) participants (N ) Mechanism
1 Jan. 5, 2018 100 RMB 10 1-Pachira
2 Jan. 6, 2018 100 RMB 10 Sharing-Pachira
3 Jan. 7, 2018 100 RMB 10 5-Pachira
4 Jan. 8, 2018 100 RMB 50 1-Pachira
5 Jan. 8, 2018 50 RMB 50 1-Pachira
6 Jan. 9, 2018 100 RMB 50 Sharing-Pachira
7 Jan. 9, 2018 50 RMB 50 Sharing-Pachira
8 Jan. 10, 2018 100 RMB 50 5-Pachira
9 Jan. 10, 2018 50 RMB 50 5-Pachira
10 Jan. 11, 2018 500 RMB 50 1-Pachira
11 Jan. 12, 2018 500 RMB 50 Sharing-Pachira
12 Jan. 13, 2018 500 RMB 50 5-Pachira
Generally, three performance metrics should be concerned:
total number of participants, total contribution of participants,
and average contribution of participants. However, two prac-
tical factors need to be considered. First, it is a common
phenomenon that users’ participation enthusiasm declines over
time, which has been described in some literature [21], [52],
and verified through a long-term experiment [53]. It means
that it is not fair to directly compare the total number of
participants, as our experiments span a long time. In order
to reduce the effect of this factor, we consider another metric,
total number of active users, meaning the number of users
who have ever opened the APP in a certain day. Note that,
the reason that an active user opened the APP may be his
interest in the APP itself or in the certain task. Whereas a
participator must be interested in the certain task. Thus, we use
a metric called Relative Participation Ratio (RPR) to represent
the actual attractiveness of a task, defined as follows:
RPR =
# of participants
# of active users− # of participants
,
(21)
where the denominator could be used to indicate the actual
activeness of users that is independent of a certain task.
Second, there is a strong randomness on whether a user can
find the treasure. In order to reduce the effect of this factor
on evaluating different incentive mechanisms, we revise the
contribution function in Eq. (20) as follows:
C(u) = 0.5 ∗Dur(u) + 0.5 ∗ 0.1 ∗Dis(u), (22)
which is used for computing the total contribution of partici-
pants (TCP) and average contribution of participants (ACP).
D. Experimental Results
In our experiments, 20 new users registered in our APP, re-
sulting in 82 registered users in total by adding 62 initial users.
However, there are always some inactive users each day. First,
we verify the phenomenon that users’ participation enthusiasm
declines over time. Fig. 7 shows the changes in the number of
active users in 9 days. Generally, there is a significant decline
in the number of active users over time. Although the number
of active users shows a transient increase on Jan. 8 and Jan.
11, one big reason is the increase of the budget (B) or the limit
on the number of participants (N ). Moreover, the number of
active users shows a significant decreasing trend over time for
the same settings of B and N (by comparing Jan. 5-7, Jan.
8-10, and Jan. 11-13, respectively). This justifies the usage of
the metric RPR as explained earlier.
Next, we analyze the experimental results on the three
metrics introduced earlier: RPR, TCP, and ACP. Moreover,
the impacts of the budget constraint (B) and the number of
required participants (N ) are investigated. Note that, when
we set N = 10, the number of participants achieves the
limitation for all of the three incentive mechanisms. Thus, it is
unnecessary to consider the RPR and ACP for the experiments
in Jan. 5-7.
Relative Participation Ratio (RPR): Fig. 8 shows the RPR
under different budget constraints when we fix N = 50. When
B = 50 RMB, the 1-Pachira lottree has the highest RPR; when
B = 100 RMB, three mechanisms’ RPRs are very close; when
B = 500 RMB, the Sharing-Pachira lottree has the highest
RPR.
Total Contribution of Participants (TCP): Fig. 9 plots
the TCP under different values of N when we fix B = 100,
from which we observe that the Sharing-Pachira lottree has the
highest TCP when a small number of participants is required,
while the 1-Pachira lottree has the highest TCP when a large
number of participants is required. Fig. 10 plots the TCP under
different values of B when we fix N = 50, from which we
observe that the 1-Pachira lottree has the highest TCP when
there is a small budget constraint (50 RMB and 100 RMB),
while the Sharing-Pachira lottree has the highest TCP when
there is a large budget constraint (500 RMB).
Average Contribution of Participants (ACP): Fig. 11
plots the ACP under different budget constraints when we fix
N = 50. When B = 50 RMB, the 1-Pachira lottree has a
slightly higher ACP than the other two mechanisms; when
B = 100 RMB, the 1-Pachira lottree has a similar ACP as the
5-Pachira lottree, which is clearly higher than the Sharing-
Pachira lottree; when B = 500 RMB, the Sharing-Pachira
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Fig. 7. Changes in the number of active users in 9 days.
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Fig. 8. Relative participation ratio under different budget constraints when
the limit on the number of participants is fixed as N = 50.
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Fig. 9. Total contribution of participants under different limits on the number
of participants when the budget is fixed as B = 100 RMB.
lottree has the highest ACP, which is clearly higher than the
other two mechanisms.
Summary: In essence, the above results are almost all con-
sistent with the CPT and the analysis in Sec. III-D, which also
validate our important theoretical guidance to the mechanism
selection in Sec. III-D. Note that, some results seem not to be
very matched with the theoretical analysis or our intuition. For
example, the budget 100 RMB results in lower RPR, TCP, and
RPR than the budget 50 RMB when we fix N = 50. It might
be due to the impact of task release time or order. For another,
the 5-Pachira lottree is sometimes best but sometimes worst.
It exhibits slight instability, the reason of which is difficult,
if not impossible, to understand as human psychology and
behavior are themselves very complex. Nevertheless, it does
not affect the obvious regularity from our experimental results
that is indeed very matched with our theoretical guidance in
Sec. III-D.
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straints when the limit on the number of participants is fixed as N = 50.
VI. RELATED WORK
Many incentive mechanisms have been proposed for crowd-
sourcing [19]–[27]. Generally, these mechanisms fall into two
categories: the crowdsourcer-centric mechanisms, where the
crowdsourcer provides a fixed reward to participates, and the
user-centric mechanisms, where users have their reserve prices
for crowdsourcing services. For the former, a Stackelberg
game is often used by assuming that the costs of participants
or their probability distribution is known [19], [20]. For the
latter, various types of auctions are often used [21]–[27].
Lee and Hoh [21] designed a dynamic auction mechanism
for purchasing users’ sensing data. Jaimes et al. [22] further
considered a budget constraint and users’ locations. Yang et al.
[19] proposed the MSensing auction mechanism, and proved
that it satisfied several properties including computational
efficiency, individual rationality, profitability, and truthfulness.
Zhang et al. [23] proposed an auction mechanism for incen-
tivizing crowd workers to label a set of binary tasks under
a strict budget constraint. Zhang et al. [24] considered three
auction models, which involve cooperation and competition
among users. Zhao et al. proposed two kinds of online auc-
tion mechanisms: budget-feasible mechanisms [25] and frugal
mechanisms [26]. Guo et al. [27] proposed a dynamic and
quality-enhanced auction mechanism.
On the other hand, some incentive tree mechanisms have
been investigated in various fields. Emek et al. [35] presented
multi-level marketing mechanisms that motivate participants
to promote a certain product among their friends through
social networks. Drucker and Fleischer [36] proposed a family
of multi-level marketing mechanisms that preserve natural
properties and are simple to implement. Chen et al. [37]
designed efficient sybil-proof incentive mechanisms, called the
direct referral mechanisms, for retrieving information from
networked agents. Zhang et al. [38] proposed a sybil-proof
incentive tree mechanism for crowdsourcing scenarios where
the contribution model is considered to be submodular and
time-sensitive. Lv and Moscibroda [32] presented two families
of incentive tree mechanisms for crowdsourcing, where each
family achieves a set of desirable properties. Zhang et al.
[39] designed an auction-based incentive tree mechanism for
mobile crowd sensing which combines the advantages of
auctions and incentive trees. However, all of these studies
failed to account for a budget constraint. To the best of our
knowledge, only the early work [40] designed a class of
incentive tree mechanisms with budget constraint, but they
violate BC and allow only one winner.
Besides, some studies have been conducted to examine
incentive mechanisms by real-world experiments. Reddy et al.
[41] examined various micro-payment schemes from a pilot
study in a university campus sustainability initiative. Musthag
et al. [42] et al. used a combination of statistical analysis and
models from labor economics to evaluate three micro-payment
schemes in the context of high-burden user studies. Celis et
al. [43] investigated the benefits and potential pitfalls in em-
ploying a lottery-based payment mechanism for crowdsourcing
via experiments on MTurk. Rula et al. [44] compared micro-
payments and lottery based schemes by using data from a
large, 2-day experiment with 96 participants at a corporate
conference. Rokicki et al. [45] compared three classes of
reward schemes, linear reward, competitive-based, and lottery-
based by large-scale experimental evaluations. They further
investigated how team mechanisms can be leveraged to im-
prove the cost efficiency of crowdsourcing [46]. However, all
of these studies lacked a general and solid theoretical basis
to account for their experimental results, and none of them
considered incentive tree mechanisms.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated budget-consistent incentive
tree mechanisms for crowdsourcing. We proposed three types
of generalized lottree mechanisms, 1-Pachira, K-Pachira, and
Sharing-Pachira for allowing one winner, multiple winners,
and each participant to be a winner, respectively. We proved
that our mechanisms satisfy BC, CCI, CSI, VPC, USB and
USA. A theoretical guidance to the mechanism selection was
provided for satisfying different requirements. Both extensive
simulations and realistic experiments were conducted to con-
firm our theoretical analysis.
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